3. The Arab Revolt

Jewish Power 

The Marxist Zionist movement Poale Zion was active in Britain during World War I, and influential on the drafting by Sidney Webb (1859 – 1947) and Arthur Henderson (1863 – 1935) of the Labour Party’s War Aims Memorandum, recognizing the “right of return” of Jews to Palestine, a document which preceded the Balfour Declaration by three months.[1] Sidney Webb, a co-founder of the London School of Economics, was an early member of the Fabian Society, the British socialist organization founded in 1884, along with his wife Beatrice, H.P. Blavatsky’s successor Annie Besant, and George Bernard Shaw. The Fabian Society was as a splinter group of the Fellowship of the New Life, composed of artists and intellectuals, which included Annie Besant and also members of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR). Fellowship members included Shaw, Besant, Karl Marx’s daughter Eleanor, Walt Whitman’s homosexual lover Edward Carpenter, and sexologist Havelock Ellis. Leading Fabians included Bertrand Russell, H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley’s brother Julian. Sidney and Beatrice Webb set up the Coefficients, a society which included Leo Amery and Alfred Milner, two core members of the Round Table, who would play a formative role in authoring the Balfour Declaration.[2]

When the attempts by Herzl had also failed to gain the support for a German protectorate in Palestine from the Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 in Mikveh Israel, he turned to Great Britain in the same year, thereby creating the pro-British faction that was soon to be led by Chaim Weizmann (1874 – 1952), author of the Balfour Declaration and later as the first president of Israel. Max Bodenheimer wrote:

 

Despite the failure, Herzl did not want to drop the idea of a German protectorate. Already, then, Herzl represented the view that for us the question was solely whether we would come under German or British protection. Had the Kaiser leaned towards our cause, the movement would have had a German orientation. The question pressed for a decision in the near future.[3]

 

G.H. Fitzmaurice, who had been appointed British consul to Istanbul and served as a British dragoman to Lowther before World War I, noted that, as leaders of the CUP, the Dönmeh Jews now controlled the Ottoman government, and their goal was to hand Palestine over to the Zionists. Fitzmaurice, therefore, proposed that Britain should promise Palestine to the Jews immediately, in return for the Dönmeh withdrawing their support from the Ottoman government, which would then inevitably lead to its collapse.[4] Fitzmaurice, then attached to the intelligence division at the British Admiralty, lobbied Hugh James O’Bierne, an experienced and well-respected British diplomat. On February 28, 1916, O’Bierne composed the first Foreign Office memo linking the fate of Palestine with both Zionist interests and British chances of victory in World War I.[5]

Written on December 9, 1917, when much of Palestine had already been overrun by General Allenby’s army and his Arab allies, and Jerusalem was to fall in a month, United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary and Round Table member Lord Balfour (1848 – 1930), on behalf of the British government, and address to Lord Walter Rothschild (1868 – 1937), the son of fellow Round Tabler Baron Nathan Rothschild, stated in his Declaration:

 

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

 

After reading O’Beirne’s memo and some other materials, Mark Sykes (1879 – 1919), another important figure of the Foreign Office, concluded that the Zionists represented “the key of the situation,” by which he meant: to Britain and the Allies’ victory in the war. “With ‘Great Jewry’ against us,” he warned, there would be no possibility of such a victory. The reason being that Zionism was “atmospheric, international, cosmopolitan, subconscious and unwritten, nay often unspoken.” Sykes now warned of the consequences of the Allies not endorsing a Jewish homeland in Palestine: “optimism in Berlin, dumps in London, unease in Paris, resistance to last ditch in C’ople, dissension in Cairo, Arabs all squabbling among themselves.”[6]

Sykes would become a key negotiator of the Balfour Declaration, based on a draft by Chaim Weizmann, later President of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO). Weizmann was aware of the full extent of Lord Balfour’s anti-Semitism, as Weizmann wrote of Balfour that, “He told me how he had once had a long talk with Cosima Wagner [wife of Richard Wagner] at Bayreuth and that he shared many of her anti-Semitic postulates.”[7] “Many [gentiles] have a residual belief in the power and the unity of Jewry,” one of Weizmann’s followers observed many years later. “We suffer for it, but it is not wholly without its compensations.… To exploit it delicately and deftly belongs to the art of the Jewish diplomat.”[8] Likewise, Balfour’s cousin and the son of Lord Salisbury, Robert Cecil (1864 – 1958), who became Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and who was in favor of Britain supporting the Zionist movement wrote to his colleagues: “I do not think it is easy to exaggerate the international power of the Jews.”[9]

 

Balfour Declaration

Weizmann moved from Switzerland to England in 1904. On January 27, 1905, Weizmann met with Lord Balfour, who had just launched his 1905–1906 election campaign after resigning as Prime Minister. Earlier that year, Balfour had successfully passed the Aliens Act through Parliament to restrict the wave of immigration into Britain from Jews fleeing the Russian Empire. The session was arranged by Charles Dreyfus (1848 – 1935), a distant relative of Alfred Dreyfus, of the Dreyfus Affair in France.[10] When Balfour asked what Weizmann’s objections had been to the 1903 Uganda Scheme that Herzl had supported, Weizmann responded that he believed the English are to London as the Jews are to Jerusalem.[11]

In January 1914, Weizmann first met Nathan Rothschild’s uncle, Baron Edmond de Rothschild, about a project to build a Hebrew university in Jerusalem. The Baron was not part of the WZO, but had funded the Jewish agricultural colonies of the First Aliyah, like Mikveh Israel, whose headmaster was Charles Netter, one of the founders of the first Masonic lodge in Jerusalem in 1873.[12] Later that year, the Baron’s son, James de Rothschild (1878 – 1957), requested a meeting with Weizmann on November 25, 1914, to enlist him in influencing the British government.[13] Through James’ wife Dorothy, Weizmann was to meet Rózsika Rothschild, who introduced him to the English branch of the family, in particular her husband Nathaniel Charles (1877 – 1923) and his older brother Walter, recipient of the Balfour Declaration.[14]

Immediately following Britain’s declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, the War Cabinet began to consider the future of Palestine, then under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Within two months, a memorandum, titled The Future of Palestine, was circulated to the War Cabinet by a Zionist member, Herbert Samuel (1870 – 1963), proposing the support of Zionist ambitions in order to enlist the support of Jews in the wider war. Samuel was the first nominally-practicing Jew to serve as a Cabinet minister and to become the leader of a major British political party. David Lloyd George, once described Samuel, his former colleague, as “a greedy, ambitious and grasping Jew with all the worst characteristics of his race.”[15]

In terms of British politics, the Balfour Declaration resulted from the coming into power of Lloyd George, a Christian Zionist, and his Cabinet, which had replaced the H.H. Asquith led-Cabinet in December 1916. A committee had been established in April 1915 by Asquith to determine their policy towards the Ottoman Empire including Palestine. Asquith had favored post-war reform of the Ottoman Empire. Lloyd George and Lord Balfour, who was appointed as his Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, favored a post-war partition of the Ottoman Empire as a major British war aim.[16] Lloyd George’s War Cabinet included only four other members: Andrew Bonar Law, Arthur Henderson, and Alfred Milner and fellow Round Tabler George Curzon. The British military was represented by Leo Amery (1873 – 1955), also an original member of the Round Table, who was a parliamentary under-secretary in Lloyd George’s national government. Amery, who was of Hungarian Jewish descent, was also an active Freemason.[17]

Following the change in government, Sir Mark Sykes was promoted into the War Cabinet Secretariat with responsibility for Middle Eastern affairs. By the end of the month, he had been introduced to Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow. Sokolow had been part of the meeting in Istanbul in 1909 with Jabotinsky, Wolffsohn and Ussishkin to establish a Zionist controlled press network in the Ottoman Empire.[18] The first negotiations between the British and the Zionists took place at a conference on February 7, 1917, at the London home of Moses Gaster (1856 – 1939), the founder of the British Zionist Federation. Included were Sykes, Weizmann, Sokolow, Baron Walter Rothschild, and Herbert Samuel. Balfour met Weizmann at the Foreign Office on March 22, 1917, where Weizmann explained that the Zionists had a preference for a British protectorate over Palestine, as opposed to an American, French or international arrangement. Balfour agreed, but warned that “there may be difficulties with France and Italy.”[19]

Following the United States’ entry into the war on April 6, 1917, Balfour led a mission to Washington, DC and New York, where he discussed Zionism with President Wilson’s ally, Louis Brandeis (1856 – 1941), a known Frankist who had been appointed as a Supreme Court Justice the previous year.[20] By June 13, 1917, it was acknowledged by Ronald Graham, head of the Foreign Office’s Middle Eastern affairs department, that the three most relevant politicians Lord Balfour, Lloyd George, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, were all in favor of Britain supporting the Zionist movement. On the same day, Weizmann had written to Graham to advocate for a public declaration.[21] Six days later, at a meeting on June 19, Balfour asked Walter Rothschild and Weizmann to submit a formula for a declaration. The decision to release the declaration was taken by the British War Cabinet on October 31, 1917. Also consulted was President Woodrow Wilson. Amery helped draft the Balfour Declaration, an idea proposed by Milner. Weizmann helped to draft the declaration, along with the assistance of Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter (1882 – 1965) and Rabbi Stephen Wise (1874 – 1949), all leading Zionists and known Sabbateans.[22]

 

McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 

In 1916, in the midst of World War I, assisted by T.E. Lawrence, Hussein’s son Faisal I and the British army coordinated the Arab Revolt, would finally succeed in wresting Middle Eastern territories—and most importantly Palestine—from the Ottoman Empire, and helping to end the Caliphate. In June, the Arab Revolt began when an Arab army moved against Ottoman forces. They participated in the capture of Aqabah and the severing of the Hijaz railway, a strategic link through the Arab peninsula that ran from Damascus to Medina. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, under the command of General Allenby, advanced into the Ottoman territories of Palestine and Syria. The British advance culminated in the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918 and the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire on October 31, 1918, after which the empire was divided amongst the victorious powers. The Turkish people refused to accept this arrangement, however, and under Kemal Atatürk, the remnants of the Young Turk movement formed a government in Ankara, and created an army that forced the Greeks and Italians out of Anatolia, while the British and French refused to intervene. With the end of Turkish rule in Syria, supporters of the Arab Revolt in Damascus declared a government loyal to the Sharif Hussein. Faisal had been declared “King of the Arabs” by a handful of religious leaders and other notables in Mecca. Five days later, an armistice with the Ottoman Empire came into effect.

The genesis of the Arab Revolt was the Damascus Protocol, signed on May 23, 1915, between Faisal and Al-Fatat and Al-Ahd, declaring they would support Sharif Hussein’s revolt against the Ottoman Empire, if the demands in the protocol were submitted to the British, and outlining territorial gains that would become the basis of the Arab understanding of the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence.[23] After Faisal’s visit of Faisal to Damascus in early 1915, al-Fatat and al-Ahd had been suspected by Djemal Pasha of conspiracy and treason against the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence the societies were disbanded and their members dispersed. Among them was Lieutenant Muhammed Sharif al-Faruqi (1891 – 1920), who was arrested and sent to the Gallipoli front, but he defected to the British in August, claiming to have important information for the British. He urged the British to support an independent Arab state as outlined in the Damascus Protocol, and claimed a delay would lead Sharif Hussein to support Germany and the Ottomans. Al-Faruqi’s claims solidified British Egypt’s conceptions that the Arab world was ready for a revolt. Kitchener’s followers in Egypt and elsewhere used this information to persuade Henry McMahon to meet Hussein's demands. As summarized by Karsh and Karsh:


In his debriefing by the Cairo intelligence department he painted a grandiose picture of the two secret societies: they had a branch in “every important town or station,” commanded the loyalty of “the natives, sedentary and nomads, and all sects including the Nuseiria,” and their treasury had accumulated the impressive sum of £100,000 from membership subscriptions; 90 per cent of the Arab officers in the Turkish army and a part of the Kurdish officers were al-Ahd members and they had already stirred up a number of local revolts; so formidable was the societies’ power throughout the Ottoman dominions that the Turks and the Germans had not only foregone any attempts to suppress them but had actually offered to fulfill their demands, but both societies “would sooner have a promise of half from England than of the whole from Turkey and Germany.”[24]

 

On July 12, 1915, shortly after a delegation of al-Fatat and al-‘Ahd had visited Arabia and swore allegiance to Sharif Hussein, a personal envoy of his son Abdullah had arrived in the Sudan to explore the possibility of British military assistance. Two days later, Abdullah sent a letter on to Ronald Storrs of the Arab Bureau on behalf of his father, now styling himself a champion of “the whole of the Arab nation without any exception,” a pretention that, as Storrs described, “bordered upon the tragi-comic.”[25] Sharif Hussein listed his grand ambitions for Arab domains, which were reported by the Foreign Office as “dictated by extreme pan-Arab aspiration,”[26] and which included:

 

…the independence of the Arab state, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37 degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn Umar), Amadia, upto the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea upto Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate of Islam.[27]

 

The letter was to inaugurate a long-drawn-out and controversial correspondence in 1915 and 1916, exchanged between Sharif Hussein and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Egypt, known as the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, in which the government of Britain agreed to recognize Arab independence in a large region after the war in exchange for the Sharif of Mecca launching the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. McMahon promised Hussein an independent area under Arab governance that was to include what was then the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, the Ottoman district that encompassed Jerusalem as well as Hebron, Jaffa, Gaza and Beersheba—later Mandatory Palestine—in exchange for Arab support in Britain’s conflict against the Ottoman Turks, in what came to be known as the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans.[28] Most of the officers would serve in Sharif Hussein’s army during the Arab Revolt and later in Faisal’s Syrian army were members of Al-‘Ahd.[29]

 

Sykes-Picot 

However, contrary to their promises of the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, in characteristic duplicity, the British had secretly ratified the contradictory Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, between Great Britain and France, with assent from Russia and Italy, to define their mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in an eventual partition of the Ottoman Empire. France was to control southeastern Turkey, the Kurdistan Region, Syria and Lebanon. In contradiction with the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, the agreement allocated to Britain control of what is today southern Israel and Palestine, Jordan and southern Iraq, and an additional small area that included the ports of Haifa and Acre to allow access to the Mediterranean.

The French position in regard to Palestine and the wider Syria region during the lead up to the Balfour Declaration was largely dictated by the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and was complicated from November 23, 1915, by increasing French awareness of the British discussions with the Sherif of Mecca.[30] Italy’s participation in the war, which began following the Treaty of London, a secret agreement concluded on April 26, 1915, by Great Britain, France, and Russia on the one part, and Italy on the other, in order to entice the latter to enter World War I on the side of the Triple Entente. The agreement involved promises of Italian territorial expansion against Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and in Africa where it was promised enlargement of its colonies. Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915.

The Treaty of London did not include involvement in the Middle Eastern sphere until the April 1917 Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, between British and French Prime Ministers, David Lloyd George and Alexandre Ribot, and the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Paolo Boselli and Sidney Sonnino.[31] Nathan’s mother was Sarina Nathan, the financier and confidant of Mazzini.[32] Italian Prime Ministers, Sidney Sonnino (1847 – 1922) and Luigi Luzzatti (1841 – 1927), were both Jewish and Scottish Rite Masons.[33] Ernesto Nathan (1848 – 1921), an admirer of Mazzini and the Jewish Lord Mayor of Rome, was Grand Master of the Grand Orient of Italy.[34] At this conference, Lloyd George had raised the question of a British protectorate of Palestine and the idea “had been very coldly received” by the French and the Italians.[35]

On April 3, 1917, Sykes met with Lloyd George, Curzon and Hankey (1877 – 1963) to receive his instructions, namely to keep the French onside while “not prejudicing the Zionist movement and the possibility of its development under British auspices, [and not] enter into any political pledges to the Arabs, and particularly none in regard to Palestine.”[36] First Sykes in early May, and then Picot and Sykes together, visited the Hijaz later in May to discuss the agreement with Faisal and Hussein. Hussein was reportedly persuaded to agree to a formula to the effect that the French would pursue the same policy in Syria as the British in Baghdad, since Hussein believed that Baghdad would be part of the Arab State, that had eventually satisfied him.[37]

Before travelling to the Middle East, Picot, through Sykes, invited Nahum Sokolow, an author of the Balfour Declaration, to Paris to educate the French government on Zionism.[38] Sokolow met Picot and other French officials, and convinced the French Foreign Office to accept for study a statement of Zionist aims “in regard to facilities of colonization, communal autonomy, rights of language and establishment of a Jewish chartered company.”[39] Sykes went on ahead to Italy and had meetings with the British ambassador and British Vatican representative to prepare the way for Sokolow once again. On May 6, 1917, Sokolow was granted an audience with Pope Benedict XV, who according to Sokolow expressed general sympathy and support for the Zionist project.[40] On May 21, Angelo Sereni, president of the Committee of the Jewish Communities, presented Sokolow to Sonnino, and was also received by Boselli. Sonnino arranged for the secretary general of the ministry to send a letter to the effect that, although he could not express himself on the merits of a program which concerned all the allies, “generally speaking” he was not opposed to the legitimate claims of the Jews.[41]

The Sykes-Picot agreement, along with others, was made public by the Bolsheviks in Moscow on November 23, 1917, and repeated in The Manchester Guardian on November 26, such that “the British were embarrassed, the Arabs dismayed and the Turks delighted.”[42] In January 1918, Sharif Hussein asked for an explanation of the Balfour Declaration, and David Hogarth, head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was dispatched to Jeddah to deliver a letter that was written by Sykes to him on behalf of the British government. The Hogarth message assured Hussein “the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world” and referred to “…the freedom of the existing population both economic and political…”[43] Similarly, two Foreign Office documents, prepared for the Peace Conference by its Political Intelligence Department in November 1918, likewise make the point that Palestine west of the Jordan was to be independent. “We are pledged to King Hussein,” said one, “that this territory shall be ‘Arab’ and ‘independent,’” and, said the other, “with regard to Palestine, His Majesty’s Government [is] committed… to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence.”[44] Lord Curzon himself, in a meeting of the Eastern Committee held on December 5, 1918, stated that Sharif Hussein had been assured that Palestine “should be Arab and independent.”[45]

 


[1] Joseph Gorny. The British Labour Movement and Zionism: 1917–1948 (London: Frank Cass), Ch.1.

[2] Walter Nimocks. Milner’s young men: the “kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial affairs (Durham: Duke University, 1968), p. 145.

[3] Dr. M. I. Bodenheimer. So Wurde Israel (Frankfurt on the Main, 1958), p. 107; cited in Polkehn. “Zionism and Kaiser Wilhelm,” p. 80.

[4] Jonathan Schneer. “How Anti-Semitism Helped Create Israel.” Foreing Policy (September 8, 2010). Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/08/how-anti-semitism-helped-create-israel-2/

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Meyer Weisgal (ed.). The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Letters, vol. VII, p. 81; cited in Lenni Brenner. Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 37.

[8] Schneer. “How Anti-Semitism Helped Create Israel.”

[9] Ibid.

[10] Geoffrey Alderman. Modern British Jewry (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 227.

[11] Chaim Weizmann. Trial and Error, The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949), p. 111.

[12] Leon Zeldis. “Jewish and Arab Masons in the Holy Land: Where Ideas can Fashion Reality.” First Regular Meeting of Quatuor Coronati Lodge 112 Regular Grand Lodge of Italy (Rome, March 20, 2004). Retrieved from http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/zeldis12.html

[13] Jonathan Schneer. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Random House, 2010), pp. 129–130.

[14] Ibid., pp. 130.

[15] Jonathan Schneer. “How Anti-Semitism Helped Create Israel.” (September 8, 2010). Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/08/how-anti-semitism-helped-create-israel-2/

[16] Danny Gutwein. “The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist-British Cooperation.” Journal of Israeli History. 35: 2 (2016), pp. 117–152.

[17] “Famous Freemasons.” Blackpool Group of Lodges and Chapters. (December 10, 2015). Retrieved from http://blackpool.westlancsfreemasons.org.uk/about-freemasonry/famous-masons/

[18] Olson. Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways, p. 104.

[19] Schneer. “How Anti-Semitism Helped Create Israel.” p. 209.

[20] Jacob de Haas. Louis D(embitz) Brandeis (Bloch, 1929), pp. 89–90.

[21] Maryanne A. Rhett. The Global History of the Balfour Declaration: Declared Nation (Routledge, 2015), p. 16.

[22] Burton A. Boxerman. The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. Anne Cipriano Venzon (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 800.

[23] Tareq Y. Ismael. Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa (University of Florida Press, 1991), p. 65.

[24] Karsh & Karsh. “Myth in the Desert,” p. 282.

[25] Storrs. Orientations, pp.160-1; cited in Karsh & Karsh. “Myth in the Desert,” p. 276.

[26] India Office to Foreign Office, 25 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2486/118580; cited in Karsh & Karsh. “Myth in the Desert,” p. 276.

[27] Karsh & Karsh. “Myth in the Desert,” p. 272.

[28] Beverly Milton-Edwards. Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (Polity Press, 2006), p. 57-59

[29] David Fromkin. A Peace To End All Peace (Avon Books, New York), p. 1990.

[30] F.W. Brecher. “French Policy toward the Levant.” Middle Eastern Studies 29: 4 (1993), pp. 642–643.

[31] J. C. Hurewitz. The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record. British-French supremacy, 1914–1945, 2 (Yale University Press, 1979).

[32] H.C.G. Matthew & B. Harrison (eds.). “The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

[33] Sir G. Lowther to Sir C. Harding (1909). Cited in Kedourie. “Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews,” p. 94.

[34] Hugh Chisholm (ed.). “Nathan, Ernesto.” Encyclopædia Britannica, 12th ed. (London & New York: The Encyclopædia Britannica Company, 1922).

[35] Robert H. Lieshout. Britain and the Arab Middle East: World War I and its Aftermath (I.B. Tauris, 2016), p. 281.

[36] Ibid., p. 203.

[37] Ibid., 165.

[38] Schneer. The Balfour Declaration, p. 210.

[39] Ibid., p. 212.

[40] Isaiah Friedman. The Question of Palestine: British-Jewish-Arab Relations, 1914–1918 (Transaction Publishers, 1973), p. 152.

[41] Frank E. Manuel. “The Palestine Question in Italian Diplomacy.” The Journal of Modern History, 27: 3 (1955), pp. 265–266.

[42] Peter Mansfield. The British Empire, 75 (Time-Life Books, 1973).

[43] Isaiah Friedman. Palestine, a Twice-Promised Land: The British, the Arabs & Zionism: 1915–1920 (Transaction Publishers, 2000), p. 328.

[44] Suleiman Mousa. “A Matter of Principle: King Hussein of the Hijaz and the Arabs of Palestine.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9: 2 (1978), p. 183.

[45] PRO, Cab. 27/24; cited in Mousa. “A Matter of Principle,” p. 184.

Divide & Conquer